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Can a Distant Relative Allow the Government Access
to Your DNA?
The Fourth Amendment Implications of Law Enforcement’s
Genealogical Search for the Golden State Killer and Other Genetic
Genealogy Investigations
by GEORGE M. DERY III
Abstract
This Article considers the advent of genetic genealogy, used by law
enforcement in capturing the Golden State Killer suspect and in other cold
cases. In these investigations, police used genetic information obtained
from the open source genealogy site, GEDmatch, to build vast family trees
spanning the entire country and several generations in order to locate
suspects whose DNA matched that left at a crime scene. This Article
analyzes the Fourth Amendment implications of government use of such
powerful technology to explore such sensitive information as DNA. The
conclusion the Supreme Court could reach, should it be called upon to
examine the privacy issues involved in such intrusions, would vary
depending on which avenue of Fourth Amendment analysis it chose to
pursue. Maryland v. King, Court precedent on government collection of
DNA, is so narrow that it provides little guidance on the issues presented
by genetic genealogy. Instead, the Court could consult its recent ruling in
Carpenter v. United States, which limited the third party doctrine that had
previously nullified privacy expectations in shared information. If it relied
on Carpenter, the Court would likely prohibit government downloads from
genealogy sites without a warrant. Further, the Court could view
individuals’ uploads of genetic information onto open source genealogy
sites as amounting to consent to view the DNA shared with all relatives.
The Court might therefore apply its third party consent precedent, which, in
relying on widely shared societal expectations, would likely prevent
warrantless collection of genetic information from genealogy sites. The
Court could, however, view police visits to genealogy sites as government
searches that occurred after private intrusions. If the Court chose this
approach, it could rule that law enforcement is free to collect the DNA
[103]
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information because it is only viewing information already exposed by
private parties. Finally, the Court could see law enforcement’s use of
genetic genealogy as an issue of standing, as recently analyzed in Byrd v.
United States. Application of Byrd’s property rights definition of standing
would likely enable the government to admit genetic evidence since
suspects lack the power to exclude others from open source sites. Thus,
although some Fourth Amendment doctrines would forbid warrantless
collection of DNA information, the government could likely rely on either
antecedent private search or standing precedent to successfully use genetic
genealogy evidence.
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Introduction
How well do you know your relatives? Can you name every cousin,
uncle, or great grandparent? Would you base your right to privacy on the
whims of every one of your blood relations? Perhaps there is a “black
sheep” in your family who continually runs afoul of the law. Maybe there
is a flaky uncle always looking for shortcuts or a grandchild who suffers
from drug addiction. Moreover, there are likely many distant relatives
whose very existence is unknown to you. Would you risk the privacy of
your most personal information, housed in your deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA), on this person’s judgment?
On National DNA Day, Sacramento District Attorney Anne Marie
Schubert announced the arrest of Joseph James DeAngelo, alleging he was
the Golden State Killer,1 believed responsible for 12 killings, 50 rapes, and
100 burglaries from 1974 and 1986.2 To catch their quarry, police used
crime scene DNA to make a partial match with the “DNA of a relative on
the open-source genealogy website GEDmatch.”3 Officials then
painstakingly constructed “25 family trees containing thousands of
relatives” in order to trace “the killer’s great-great-great grandparents, who
lived in the early 1800’s.”4 Investigators dug through “census records,
newspaper obituaries, gravesite locators, and police and commercial
databases” to whittle the possible suspects down to DeAngelo.5 District
Attorney Schubert accurately characterized law enforcement’s efforts as

1. Ray Sanchez, Elizabeth I. Johnson, Steve Almasy & Alanne Orjoux, After
Searching for more than 40 Years, Authorities Say an Ex-cop Is the Golden State Killer,
CNN (Apr. 27, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/25/us/golden-state-killerdevelopment/index.html.
2. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His
Great-great-great Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigators-first-foundhis-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_
story.html?utm_term=.26202e9e14a4.
3. Sarah Zhang, How a Genealogy Website Led to the Alleged Golden State Killer:
Powerful Tools are Now Available to Anyone Who Wants to Look for a DNA Match, Which
Has Troubling Privacy Implications, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.the
atlantic.com/science/archive/2018/04/golden-state-killer-east-area-rapist-dna-genealogy/
559070/.
4. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
5. Id.
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finding “the needle in the haystack.”6 “The answer was always going to be
in the DNA,”7 she concluded.
Law enforcement have every reason to be satisfied with its apparent
success in capturing the “clever” and “sadistic” criminal8 variously known
as the “East Area Rapist,” the “Original Night Stalker,” the “Golden State
Killer,”9 the “Diamond Knot Killer,” and the “Visalia Ransacker.”10 Erika
Hutchcraft, an investigator with the Orange County District Attorney’s
Office, considered the Golden State Killer’s “[v]ery cold, very violent”
crimes to be “some of the most horrific [she’s] had to investigate.”11
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department Detective Carol Daly deemed
this criminal “the most heinous rapist I had ever known.”12 The killer
“planned meticulously,” calling victims to learn their routines,13 casing
homes, cutting phone lines, and even turning off air conditioners “so he
could hear every sound.”14 Such careful planning enabled his attacks to be
“bizarre, cruel, and long-lasting.”15 When he was once “cornered” in a
backyard with police dogs swarming the area, “he just disappeared into
thin air.”16 Police, in finally capturing such a dangerous and elusive
suspect, can rightly celebrate the innovation and dedication leading to such
a significant achievement. Moreover, law enforcement can report other
recent successes in cases long unsolved; the genetic genealogy employed in
the Golden State Killer case has already been used to bring other notorious
suspects to justice.17

6. Sanchez et al., supra note 1.
7. Aja Romano, DNA Profiles from Ancestry Websites Helped Identify the Golden
State Killer Suspect: He Wasn’t the First Criminal to Fall to Familial DNA Matching, and
He Won’t Be the Last, VOX (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/
4/27/17290288/golden-state-killer-joseph-james-deangelo-dna-profile-match.
8. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
9. Zhang, supra note 3.
10. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
11. Sanchez et al., supra note 1.
12. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
13. Id.
14. Joseph Serna, Richard Winton & Sarah Parvini, As a Young Cop, Golden State
Killer Suspect Was Aloof, Ambitious, ‘Always Serious,’ L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2018, 3:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-golden-state-cops-20180501-story.html.
15. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
16. Serna et al., supra note 14.
17. Kyle Swenson, Undercover Cops Grabbed a DJ’s Chewing Gum. It Helped Crack
a Teacher’s 1992 Murder, Police Say, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/06/26/undercover-cops-grabbed-a-djschewing-gum-it-helped-crack-a-teachers-1992-murder-police-say/?utm_ter
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While the stakes in tracking down the Golden State Killer and other
cold-case suspects are particularly high, the Fourth Amendment privacy
concerns involved in government exploration of DNA websites are equally
significant.18 DNA, after all, is the genetic blueprint of our bodies that is
embedded in the nucleus—the core—of each cell in the human body.19 The
genetic material in every cell “carries the full sequence of your DNA,
including the mutation pattern that makes it uniquely yours.”20 DNA holds
the secret to such personal details as one’s Neanderthal ancestry, the
potential for afflictions with rare diseases, and paternity.21 One expert
warns, “[f]or a non-trivial percentage of us, there really are scary things in
our genomes.”22 In certain circumstances, DNA is coveted by companies,
insurers and police and can be considered “the most valuable thing you
own.”23
The analytical approach the Court chooses to examine government
exploration of DNA on genealogical sites will determine how it decides the
Fourth Amendment issues triggered by this new intrusion. Therefore, after
Part II reviews the definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” and the
Court’s warrant requirement. Part III examines the Golden State Killer
investigation, and Part IV analyzes the paths the Court might take in
deciding the Fourth Amendment issues concerning genetic genealogy. Part
IV discusses Maryland v. King’s Fourth Amendment consideration of
government DNA collection,24 and the Court’s third party doctrine, which
has traditionally limited the privacy expectations of those who share

m=.7abdb34dabac; April Tinsley: DNA Snares Man in Indiana Girl’s 1988 Murder, BBC
NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44851825.
18. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 442 (2013).
20. Maggie Fox, What You’re Giving Away with Those Home DNA Tests: It’s the Most
Valuable Thing You Own, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017, 6:46 AM), https://www.nbc
news.com/health/health-news/what-you-re-giving-away-those-home-dna-tests-n824776.
21. Id.; see also Patrick Cain, Privacy Risks Lurk in DNA Tests, Experts Warn, GLOBAL
NEWS (Aug. 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://globalnews.ca/news/2879276/privacy-risks-lurkin-dna-tests-experts-warn/.
22. Fox, supra note 20.
23. Id.; see also Cain, supra note 21.
24. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
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information. In addition, this section considers Carpenter’s latest word on
the third party doctrine, and its potential, dramatic effect on the Fourth
Amendment privacy of the relatives of those who upload information to
genealogy sites.25 It then explores third party consent based on an
assumption of risk and shared social expectations, and its potential impact
on the official use of genealogical sites. The Court could approach
government genetic genealogy as a state intrusion that occurs only after a
private search has been performed, thus, triggering precedent that assesses
an official probe by reference to the scope of an earlier private invasion.
Finally, since the Court might question whether a person could even claim
a Fourth Amendment violation from government exploration of a relative’s
DNA, this article explores whether a suspect could have “standing” or the
right to contest an official visit to a particular genealogy site. The standing
discussion will consider the Court’s most recent case on this issue, Byrd v.
United States.26

The Fundamentals of Fourth Amendment Protection
Against Unreasonable Searches
The Definition of a “Fourth Amendment Search”
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures”
of individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”27 In Katz v. United
States, the Court defined a “search” as a government intrusion on a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.28 In Katz, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) caught Katz “transmitting wagering information by
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal

25. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
26. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court
has defined “searches” in two ways: (1) as a government intrusion on a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy as defined in Katz, and (2) as a physical occupation of private
property for purposes of gaining information as defined in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 404–05 (2012). Jones explained, “The Government physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical
intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. As there is no evidence in the Golden State Killer
case that government officials physically visited genealogical organizations to collect
information, Jones’ physical occupation test is beyond the scope of this article. For the same
reason, the analysis of Fourth Amendment “seizures” is beyond the scope of this article.
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statute.”29 The FBI had obtained Katz’s side of a telephone conversation by
bugging his phone booth.30 When the parties argued over whether the
government’s eavesdropping by an electronic device attached to the outside
of the phone booth31 constituted a “physical penetration of a
constitutionally protected area,” the Court rejected this formulation of the
issue as “misleading.”32 The focus on “whether or not a given ‘area,’
viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’” deflected attention
away from the question of whether a person sought to preserve privacy,
even in a publicly accessible area.33 Katz concluded that a person who
occupies a phone booth, “shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.” It fell to
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, to provide the definition of a
Fourth Amendment “search:”
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ”reasonable.”34
The Court has repeatedly employed Katz’s definition of a search, as
crafted by Justice Harlan, for five decades to determine whether searches
have occurred in such diverse situations as government entry into burned
buildings,35 barns,36 bookstores,37 and bus bins.38 The resulting importance
of Katz can be seen in the fact that the Court has deemed this definition of
a search its “lodestar.”39

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984).
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 298 (1987).
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
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The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all but reasonable searches and
seizures.40 Although reasonableness is “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment,” the Constitution itself provides no yardstick for
measuring what is and is not reasonable.41 The Court worried that simply
deeming an official intrusion “reasonable,” without tying this conclusion to
“some criterion of reason,” would cause protection under the Fourth
Amendment to “approach the evaporation point.”42 The Court also noted
that the Fourth Amendment “was in large part a reaction to the general
warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and
had helped speed the movement for independence.”43 The Framers
included the “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause” provision
to ensure that an objective magistrate “might weigh the need to invade that
privacy in order to enforce the law.”44 The Court, therefore, recognized
what came to be known as the warrant requirement, which generally
mandated officers obtain a warrant before making a search.45
Riley v. California reaffirmed the Court’s warrant requirement. In
Riley, officers accessed information on a cell phone and a smart phone.46
The Court in Riley refused to allow a search of these phones as part of a
search incident to arrest, instead flatly ruling, “get a warrant.”47 Riley
explained, “[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to
discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally
requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.”48 If police fails to obtain a
warrant, the search is presumed unreasonable unless “it falls within a
specific exception to the warrant requirement.”49
Carpenter v. United States, decided in 2018, repeatedly referenced the
warrant requirement.50 The Court noted, “our cases establish that
40. In a pertinent part, the Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
42. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
43. Id. at 761.
44. Id.
45. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
46. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2840–41.
47. Id. at 2495.
48. Id. at 2482.
49. Id.
50. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018).
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warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing,” and, therefore, “[i]n the absence of a warrant, a search is
reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant
requirement.”51 Thus, the warrant mandate, articulated by the Court as
early as 1925, still limits police discretion today.52

The Search for the Golden State Killer Suspect and
Other Investigations
The Golden State Killer was a cold-blooded “serial predator” who
elaborately planned his attacks.53 Before “closing in for the kill,” he would
terrorize his victims with such strange behavior as breaking into the home
to take women’s underwear, making hang-up phone calls, or leaving
drawings on a bedroom window “that appeared to have been written in
‘bodily fluids.”54 He “stalked his victims through drainage ditches” and
returned to one neighborhood so many times that its residents slept in
shifts.55 He wore a mask and blindfolded and gagged his victims.56
In pursuing its suspect, the investigators themselves became equally
careful and inventive. Paul Holes, a cold case expert who had worked as an
inspector for the Contra Costa County District Attorney, spent some seven
years using “open source” genealogy websites to locate the Golden State
Killer suspect.57 Holes first used “Ysearch.org” to generate a “weak match”
with a 73-year-old man in Clackamas County, Oregon.58 The man willingly

51. Id. at 2213. The Carpenter Court reiterated, “we have held that official intrusion
into (a reasonable expectation of privacy) generally qualifies as a search and requires a
warrant supported by probable cause.” Id.
52. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
53. Avi Selk, The Most Disturbing Parts of the 171-page Warrant for the Golden
States Killer Suspect, WASH. POST (June 2, 2018), https://www.washington post.com/news/
post-nation/wp/2018/06/02/the-most-disturbing-parts-of-the-171-page-warrants-for-the-gold
en-state-killer-suspect/?utm_term=.d4870987d966. The search warrant affidavits for this
case can be viewed at: http://www.sacda.org/files/9415/2789/1272/P_v_DeAngelo_Redact
ed_Search_Warrant_Final.pdf [hereinafter Search Warrant].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Sanchez et al., supra note 1.
57. Matthias Gafni, Here’s the ‘Open Source’ Genealogy Website that Helped Crack
the Golden State Killer Case, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.mercur
ynews.com/2018/04/26/ancestry-23andme-deny-assisting-law-enforcement-in-east-area-rapi
st-case/.
58. Id.
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provided a DNA sample, which established his innocence.59 After this
setback, Holes visited other jurisdictions that had suffered the Golden State
Killer’s crimes in order to obtain DNA to use at a different genealogy
website, GEDmatch.60
GEDmatch is an “open-source genealogy website” based in Florida
“that pools raw genetic profiles that people publicly share to find long-lost
relatives.”61 GEDmatch differs from commercial genealogy sites such as
23andMe and Ancestry.com, which charge a fee to “millions of customers
wanting detailed information on their family, lineage and ethnicity.”62
23andMe and Ancestry.com sell testing kits that require customers to
supply a tube of saliva.63 These direct-to-consumer sites then “work very
hard to protect their customers’ privacy.”64 A spokesperson for 23andMe
declared that it had “never given customer information to law enforcement
officials,” and that the company did “not share information with employers
or insurance companies, ever, under any circumstance.”65
GEDmatch does not follow the direct-to-consumer sites’ model.
Instead of forming a commercial and confidential relationship with
consumers, it invites anyone to upload DNA profiles already generated by
the commercial sites.66 Hobbyists researching their genealogy have
uploaded “roughly a million distinct DNA sets” onto GEDmatch.67 The

59. Id.
60. Id.; Richard Winton, Tracey Lien, Paige St. John & Benjamin Oreskes, The First
Step in Finding Golden State Killer Suspect: Finding His Great-great-great-grandparents
on Genealogy Site, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-megolden-state-dna-match-20180427-story.html.
61. Gafni, supra note 57.
62. Justin Jouvenal, Mark Berman, Drew Harwell & Tom Jackman, Data on a
Genealogy Site Led Police to the ‘Golden State Killer’ Suspect. Now Others Worry About a
‘Treasure Trove of Data,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/27/data-on-a-genealogy-site-led-police-to-the-golden-sta
te-killer-suspect-now-others-worry-about-a-treasure-trove-of-data/?utm_term=.ff16e1d38
bab.
63. Zhang, supra note 3.
64. Emily Shapiro, What to Know About the Privacy of Your DNA in Wake of ‘Golden
State Killer’ Suspect’s Arrest, ABC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/
privacy-dna-wake-golden-state-killer-suspects-arrest/story?id=54777919.
65. Id.
66. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html.
67. Jouvenal et al., supra note 62. In contrast, “23andMe has more than 5 million
customers, and Ancestry.com has 10 million.” Kolata, supra note 66.
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very utility of GEDmatch is based on its openness.68 When he later learned
of the government use of GEDmatch, Curtis Rogers, a GEDmatch operator
noted “it has always been GEDmatch’s policy to inform users that the
database could be used for other uses, as set forth in the Site Policy.”69
Rogers warned, “[W]hile the database was created for genealogical
research, it is important that GEDmatch participants understand the
possible uses of their DNA, including identification of relatives that have
committed crimes or were victims of crimes.”70 According to Paul Holes,
such openness offered law enforcement officials access to “a large pool of
profiles and didn’t require a court order.”71
After Holes’ prompting, Steve Rhods, an investigator with the
Ventura County District Attorney’s Office, found a second rape kit in the
county’s coroner’s office that proved to be “the mother lode of DNA.”72
The upload to GEDmatch revealed a distant match that was “roughly the
equivalent of third cousins.”73 Holes traced back these distant relatives to
find a common ancestor.74 His search created a family lineage that “went
back to ‘great-great-great-grandparents in the early 1800s’” that mostly
identified persons “from the East Coast or Midwest.”75 The investigators
slowly tracked their suspect through the generations by tracing “offspring
to the present day.”76 Holes whittled down the “huge” family trees he had
created on Ancestry.com by consulting “census data, old newspaper
clippings,” gravesite locator, and LexisNexis.77 The task investigators
faced was daunting; out of some 25 family trees, the one including
DeAngelo contained about 1,000 members.78

68. Gafni, supra note 57.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ailsa Chang & Adhiti Bandlamudi, Tactics Used To Find Golden State Killer Raise
Privacy and Legal Questions, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.
npr.org/2018/04/27/606580162/tactics-used-to-find-golden-state-killer-raise-privacy-andlegal-questions.
72. Winton, supra note 60. The discovery of this DNA sample was due to the diligence
of a “meticulous pathologist” who had put “a duplicate evidence kit” in a freezer in 1980.
Jouvenal, supra note 2. “Many other DNA samples from the case had been depleted over
the years.” Id.
73. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
74. Id.
75. Winton, supra note 60.
76. Id.; Jouvenal, supra note 2.
77. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
78. Id.
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Towards the end of the investigation, Holes had focused on five white
men, including DeAngelo.79 Holes considered some of DeAngelo’s factors,
such as his age and his “serving full-time as a cop,” as “strike(s) against”
being the killer.80 One fact, however, was particularly damning for
DeAngelo. During a July 1978 rape, the East Area Rapist “was sobbing
and saying, ‘I hate you Bonnie, I hate you Bonnie.”81 Investigators learned
that DeAngelo “had been engaged to a woman named Bonnie in 1970.”82
In April 2018, police observed DeAngelo speeding his motorcycle down
the freeway in excess of 100 miles an hour.83 Holes noted “stop signs are
optional for this guy.”84 Detectives collected DeAngelo’s DNA from the
door of his car while he shopped in a Hobby Lobby in Roseville,
California.85 This DNA “matched semen recovered at the scene of some of
the Golden State Killer’s crime scenes.”86 They later obtained a second
sample “from a tissue in DeAngelo’s trash outside of his home.”87 Police
arrested DeAngelo on April 24, 2018.88 The warrant police obtained to
search DeAngelo’s home was based in part on the earlier genealogical
search in this case.89
The pursuit of the Golden State Killer through genealogical sites is not
an isolated case. In June of 2018, Lancaster County District Attorney,
Craig Stedman, announced at a news conference the arrest of Raymond
Rowe for the beating, sexual assault, and strangulation of Christy Mirack.90
Mirack was a 25-year-old schoolteacher whose murder case went cold
despite the forensic testing of 60 suspects and the conducting of over 1,500

79. Ryan Lillis, Here’s the Inside Story of How Police Nabbed the East Area Rapist
Suspect, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 29, 2018), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/
article210003114.html.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Paige St. John et al., DNA Lifted From Golden State Killer Suspect at Hobby Lobby
Parking Lot Key to Cracking Case, Documents Show, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-golden-state-killer-deangelo-warrant-20180
601-story.html.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Search Warrant, supra note 53, at 42.
90. Swenson, supra note 17.
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interviews.91 Mirack’s mother made a “deathbed plea in the newspaper for
new information” and her brother put up a billboard and started a Facebook
page seeking tips.92 Recognizing that they “didn’t have any more arrows in
the quiver,” authorities turned to genetic genealogy.93 The District
Attorney’s Office worked with Parabon NanoLabs, which created “a
genotype file” from semen found on the “carpeting under the victim’s body
and on her person.”94 Parabon NanoLabs uploaded this file to GEDmatch,
which enabled them to build family trees offering “highly scientific”
suggestions for traditional police investigations.95 Pennsylvania State
Police narrowed the search to Rowe, who was scheduled to perform as a
DJ at an elementary school event.96 Undercover officers then collected
chewing gum and a water bottle that Rowe had used and then discarded.97
The crime lab linked Rowe to the Mirack homicide with a “1 in 200
octillion chance the match is to another member of the Caucasian
population who is not Rowe.”98
Law enforcement also visited public genealogy sites to solve the 1988
abduction, rape, and strangulation-murder of eight-year-old April Tinsley
of Fort Wayne, Indiana.99 The case became Indiana’s “most notorious cold
case” in part due to the alleged killer’s threats toward other little girls in
Fort Wayne starting in 2004.100 The attacker left notes, found inside bags
with used condoms or Polaroid pictures of his body, on the girls’
bicycles.101 One note chillingly read, “Hi honey I been watching you I am
the same person that kidnapped an rape an kill Aproil Tinsley you are my

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Investigators have also used forensic genealogy to identify victims of crime.
Margaret Press and Colleen Fitzpatrick, co-founders of the DNA Doe Project, gave a name
to a victim of a 37-year-old homicide case in four hours. Seth Augenstein, Buck Skin Girl
Case Break Is Success of New DNA Doe Project, FORENSIC MAGAZINE (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2018/04/buck-skin-girl-case-break-success-new-dna-do
e-project. In this case, which also relied on GEDmatch, Detective Steve Hickey of the
Miami County Sheriff’s Department stated this development created “an active homicide
investigation.” Id.
99. April Tinsley: DNA Snares Man in Indiana Girl’s 1988 Murder, supra note 17.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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next vitem (sic).”102 Authorities again turned to Parabon NanoLabs to
analyze the DNA samples and then visited genealogy sites to gain a list of
suspects.103 After narrowing their search to two brothers, police collected
used condoms from the trash outside the trailer home of John D. Miller.
Obtaining a match with the crime scene samples, officials contacted Miller
and asked, “[W]hy he thought police were interested in speaking with
him.”104 Police reported that Miller answered, “April Tinsley.”105
The genetic genealogy investigations of DeAngelo, Rowe, and Miller
are the advent of a potentially game-changing technology that represents
hope for victims and families long suffering from seemingly unsolvable
crimes. At the same time, this search technology is so uniquely powerful
that it presents issues of crucial concern for Fourth Amendment rights.

Implications of the Collection and Use of DNA Information
from Genealogy Sites
Maryland v. King’s Ruling on Government DNA Collection Is
So Narrow that it Provides Inadequate Guidance for
Government Use of Genealogy Sites
Should the Golden State Killer case reach the Court, one might
suppose that the Court would consult its first case involving the Fourth
Amendment implications of government use of DNA evidence in a
criminal matter, Maryland v. King.106 Close scrutiny of King, however,
might not support such an assumption. In King, the Court considered
“whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection and analysis of a
DNA sample from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony
charges.”107 Officers arrested Alonzo King for assault by “menacing a
group of people with a shotgun.”108 Police collected a DNA sample from
King, as “part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses,” by
rubbing a “filter paper or cotton swab” against the inside of his cheek.109

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
King, 569 U.S. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440, 444.
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King’s DNA matched a sample of DNA taken from a rape occurring six
years earlier, resulting in his trial and conviction of rape.110
The corrections officers at the booking facility in King automatically
collected DNA in reliance on a Maryland statute authorizing “law
enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from ‘an individual who is
charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of
violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.’”111 The
collected sample was not to be added to a government database until after
probable cause was found at the arraignment or the detainee provided
consent.112 The statute specifically limited the use of DNA records to
identification purposes only.113 Maryland’s law explicitly prohibited
searching for “familial matches,” providing: “A person may not perform a
search of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of
an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a
biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was
acquired.”114 Government officials uploaded King’s DNA information to
Maryland’s DNA database.115 The identification of King as a rapist was
based in part on the “national project to standardize collection and storage
of DNA profiles” known as the “Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS).”116 Created by Congress and supervised by the FBI, CODIS “has
grown to include all 50 states and a number of federal agencies.”117 CODIS
“collects DNA profiles provided by local laboratories taken from arrestees,
convicted offenders, and forensic evidence found at crime scenes.”118
The King Court concluded that routine collection and analysis of
DNA upon booking was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because
“[W]hen officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a
serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in
custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like
fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure
that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”119 King reached this

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 441, 443.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 465–66.
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result without relying on the Fourth Amendment’s traditional norms of the
warrant requirement or individualized suspicion.120 Instead, the Court
assessed the reasonableness of the DNA collection by balancing the
interests of government and individual.121 To King, context was key; the
particular circumstances in which officials assumed responsibility over
persons taken into their custody both heightened government interests122
and lessened individual privacy concerns.123
When considering government concerns, King was acutely aware of
the high stakes involved in taking a person into custody because “the law is
in the act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical
dominion.”124 Officials had practical reasons for knowing “who has been
arrested and who is being tried.”125 Learning identity revealed criminal
history, which is crucial information because persons “detained for minor
offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.”126
Proper identification could alert officials to “a record of violence or mental
disorder,” and therefore disclose “the type of person” officers are
detaining.”127 Corrections officers could thus ensure that an arrestee did
“not create inordinate ‘risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee
population, and for a new detainee.’”128 DNA identification also promoted
the “substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are
available for trials” because it alerted officials to persons likely to fail to
appear in court due to outstanding pending cases.129 Further, knowing a
detainee’s past was “essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to

120. Id. at 447.
121. The Court explained, “[W]e balance the privacy-related and law enforcementrelated concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.” Id. at 448. King also noted,
“This application of ‘traditional standards of reasonableness’ requires a court to weigh ‘the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search]
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’” Id. at 448.
122. Id. at 449–456. King concluded, “In the balance of reasonableness required by the
Fourth Amendment, therefore, the Court must give great weight both to the significant
government interest at stake in the identification of arrestees and to the unmatched potential
of DNA identification to serve that interest.” Id. at 461.
123. Id. at 461-464. King ruled, “The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into
police custody “necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.” Id. at 462.
124. Id. at 449–50.
125. Id. at 450.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 452.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 452–53.
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the public,” a vital factor in assessing bail eligibility.130 Fixing identity also
served “the interests of justice” because properly connecting an arrestee to
a crime could exonerate someone “wrongfully imprisoned for the same
offense.”131
An individual arrestee’s interests suffered by comparison to the
“substantial government interest” in the “unique effectiveness of DNA
identification.”132 King viewed the intrusion of a DNA cheek swab as
“minimal”133 and the processing of a DNA sample in CODIS as
reasonable.134 While noting that genes, “the coding regions” of DNA,
provide instructions for making the proteins in an individual’s body,135
King dismissed the “noncoding” DNA, which the government used to
make a DNA identification of a person, as “‘junk’ DNA”136 which did not
reveal “information beyond identification.”137
Further, the legitimacy of privacy expectations was dependent upon
“the individual’s legal relationship with the State.”138 King’s expectations
were necessarily “diminished” because he was “an individual taken into
police custody.”139 As a person who “has been arrested on probable cause
for a dangerous offense,” King’s “freedom from police scrutiny” was
simply reduced.140 Indeed, situational factors were so central to the analysis
that the Court explicitly distinguished King’s DNA collection from a

130. Id. at 453.
131. Id. at 455.
132. Id. at 461.
133. Id. King described a buccal swab DNA sample as a “gentle rub along the inside of
the cheek” that “does not break the skin.” Id. at 463–64. The sample involved “virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain.” Id.
134. Id. at 464.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 442-43.
137. Id. at 464. Unfortunately, this information was outdated when the Court made its
ruling, for scientists already knew even before the King opinion that “[S]pecific DNA once
dismissed as junk plays an important role in brain development and might be involved in
several devastating neurological diseases.” Jeffrey Norris, Brain Development Is Guided by
Junk DNA that Isn’t Really Junk, UCSF (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.ucsf. edu/news/
2013/04/105126/brain-development-guided-junk-dna-isn%E2%80%99t-really-junk. While
the Norris article is dated April 15, 2013, the Court decided King on June 3, 2013. Any
information of a genetic predisposition for a “devastating” neurological disease, in light
of the possible consequences for such practical matters as insurance and employment, could
rightly be seen as highly personal and sensitive.
138. King, 569 U.S. at 462.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 463.
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search of “the average citizen.”141 King warned that changing context could
result in a different ruling; the Court noted, “If in the future police analyze
samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a
particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that
case would present additional privacy concerns not present here.”142 The
Court thus concluded, “In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by
probable cause respondent’s expectations of privacy were not offended” by
the DNA collection in this case.143
As the Court’s only case directly dealing with a Fourth Amendment
search of a person’s DNA, King must be accounted for when considering
police use of genetic genealogy. King deemed reasonable the mandatory
collection of DNA from arrestees of violent offenses about to be taken into
official custody.144 The utility of this holding in assessing government
collection of DNA information from genealogical sites, however, might be
quite limited. The context of King, so important to the Court, significantly
differed from that of genetic genealogy. In King, officers had probable
cause that the person searched had committed a crime.145 The government
therefore had the “uncontested” right, “always recognized under English
and American law,” to search the lawfully arrested person.146 Further, King
was jailed and therefore exposed to booking procedures having “different
constitutional justifications” than searches in other places.147 King’s jail
context was crucial because State interests “are further different” when the
government takes on the grave responsibility of “subjecting the body of the
accused to its physical dominion.”148 In this setting, DNA identification
was critical for a host of government interests, including safety of staff,
fellow prisoners, and the arrestee himself,149 determination of availability
for trial, potential danger to the public,150 and the interests of justice.151 In
contrast, the government visits to genealogy sites in pursuit of DeAngelo,
Rowe, and Miller lacked all the contextual justifications bolstering King’s

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 464–65.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 449
Id.
Id.
Id. at 449-50.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 453.
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collection of DNA. To say that police lacked probable cause pinpointing
these suspects is an enormous understatement; law enforcement did not
even have these individuals on its radar. As for jail, these cases had become
so cold that, before GEDmatch, subjecting the bodies of these suspects to
the government’s physical dominion was a practical impossibility.
King’s contextual limit similarly suffers when comparing King’s
individual interests with those of the genetic genealogy suspects. King, due
to his “legal relationship with the state” as an arrestee entering custody, had
“diminished” privacy expectations.152 DeAngelo, Rowe, and Miller, having
no such custodial relationship with the State when law enforcement visited
the genealogy sites, suffered no corresponding diminution of privacy
expectations. Instead, they were the very “average citizen(s)” King
distinguished from jail inmates.153 Finally, King explicitly noted its case
did not involve “familial” matching,” the central strategy involved in the
genetic genealogy cases.154 Thus, while King offers a detailed picture of the
Court’s analysis of Fourth Amendment privacy issues involving DNA, the
narrowness of its ruling undermines its usefulness in providing guidance
for government exploration of genealogical sites.

Carpenter v. United States’ Recent Limit on the Third Party
Doctrine, Which Held that Persons Undermine Their Privacy
Expectations by Sharing Information, Could Dramatically
Constrain Government Downloads from Genealogical Sites
When one uploads his or her genetic information onto a genealogical
site, he or she shares it with third parties. The whole point of exposing this
information to the public on the website is to enable someone else to access
the information about one’s DNA in hopes of identifying lost or unknown
relatives. In revealing genetic information when searching for one’s family,
is a person giving up his or her right to privacy from a government search
of this information? The Court’s third party doctrine could directly affect
the Fourth Amendment rights of those who upload their DNA.155
Katz rejected the notion that a Fourth Amendment “search” requires a
physical trespass upon a constitutionally protected area, explaining that
what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 441.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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the public, may be constitutionally protected.156 By the same token,
however, the Court declared, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”157 Katz’s “knowingly exposes” language
ultimately took on great significance in creating the third party doctrine
where “an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”158
For decades, the Court ruled that sharing information with another
person often amounted to losing any Fourth Amendment privacy protection
in the information disclosed. In United States v. Dionisio, where a grand
jury subpoenaed an illegal gambling suspect to provide a voice exemplar
for comparison with FBI recordings, the Court found that the government
demand involved no intrusion on a reasonable expectation of privacy.159
Because “nothing is being exposed to the grand jury that has not previously
been exposed to the public at large,” Dionisio could not have “a reasonable
expectation that others” would not know the sound of his voice “any more
than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the
world.”160
Information sharing with a “third party” squandered Fourth
Amendment privacy in United States v. Miller.161 In Miller, the government
sought a bank depositor’s “checks and other bank records” in its
investigation of the depositor’s unregistered still and whiskey business.162
When Miller objected that his bank documents had been illegally seized,
the Court found no intrusion of a Fourth Amendment interest.163 Miller
noted that the depositor, “in revealing his affairs to another,” took the risk
that the information so revealed would “be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”164 The Court therefore ruled, “the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 351.
Id.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1973).
Id. at 14.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 438, 440.
Id. at 443.
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and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”165
Sharing information, even as sensitive as personal finances and even with
an institution as discrete as a bank, led to exposure of that information to
the government without Fourth Amendment protection.
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court determined that what was true about
sharing one’s voice and banking records was also true about sharing
numbers dialed from a phone.166 In Smith, police used a pen register to
collect the numbers a robber dialed from his phone in making threatening
calls to a robbery victim.167 When Smith sought to suppress the dialed
numbers, the Court refused to do so, noting that he “voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business”168 Smith
declared once again that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”169
The Court, in California v. Greenwood, even applied its third party
doctrine to persons who roll their trash to the curb for collection.170
Greenwood found no Fourth Amendment search occurred when police
rummaged through garbage for narcotics evidence because the residents
“exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to
Fourth Amendment protection.”171 Placing trash on the curb made it
“readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, (and) snoops.”172
The whole point of leaving refuse at the curb was “for the express purpose
of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have
sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to
do so.”173 Therefore, there was “no reasonable expectation of privacy” in
the discarded items.174
The Court’s latest pronouncement on the third party doctrine, in its
2018 case, Carpenter v. United States, was more nuanced than previous
declarations. In Carpenter, police officers and FBI agents suspected
Timothy Carpenter of being involved in robberies of nine stores in

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 742.
Id. at 737, 744.
Id. at 743–44.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
Id. at 37–38, 40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 41.
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Michigan and Ohio.175 Federal prosecutors therefore sought court orders
“under the Stored Communications Act” to obtain Carpenter’s cell phone
records.176 Federal magistrate judges ordered MetroPCS and Sprint to
provide cell site information for Carpenter’s phone over the four months
during which the robberies were committed.177 Pursuant to the orders,
agents collected “cell-site location information (CSLI)” over 127 days from
MetroPCS alone.178 CSLI is the information wireless carriers collect from
cell phones in order to “continuously scan their environment looking for
the best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site.”179
Smartphones tap into the wireless network “several times a minute” even
when the owner is not using the phone.180 The resulting “time-stamped”
records, which companies store for their own business purposes, are the
CSLI.181 CSLI gives authorities a precise map of where a phone, and
therefore the phone’s owner, has been. The collection of Carpenter’s CSLI
provided officials with “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s
movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”182 When the
government used the CSLI to place Carpenter near four of the robberies,
Carpenter objected that the use of these data constituted an unreasonable
search made in absence of a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement.183

In considering Carpenter’s claim, the Court acknowledged that
it had previously held, “a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”184
The government, therefore, was “typically free to obtain” the shared
information “from the recipient without triggering Fourth Amendment
protections.”185 Carpenter, however, asserted that the third party doctrine
had been limited from the start. The Court noted that, in Miller, the case
175. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2212 (2018).
176. Id. The level of suspicion needed to support the court orders was “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe.” Id. Such reasonable
suspicion falls short of the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause for a warrant.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2211.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2211, 2212.
182. Id. at 2212.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2216.
185. Id.
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where the third party doctrine traced its “roots,” the information lacking
Fourth Amendment protection had: 1) a particular “nature,” and 2) a
specific relationship with the person claiming privacy.186 The nature of
Miller’s documents “confirmed Miller’s limited expectation of privacy”
because they were “not confidential communications but negotiable
documents,” such as checks “exposed” to employees “in the ordinary
course of business.”187 As for Miller’s relationship with the documents, it
was quite weak because he could “assert neither ownership nor possession”
of the papers.188 Carpenter then declared that Smith, the third party case
occurring only three years after Miller, was a similarly narrow case.189
Smith involved pen registers—devices that merely recorded numbers
dialed from a phone—a technology with “limited capabilities.”190 Together,
Miller and Smith “did not rely solely on the act of sharing” but instead
took into account the “nature” of the information sought and the “limited
capabilities” of the government technology used to collect the
information.191
Carpenter then distinguished Miller and Smith from the facts in its
own case. The nature of the information collected in Carpenter represented
a “world of difference” from that obtained in Miller and Smith.192 The
CSLI presented “an all-encompassing record” of the “privacies of life,”
including aspects of “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”193 Unlike prior methodologies, cell phone location had a
“retrospective quality” enabling the government to “travel back in time” to
reconstruct a person’s movements “every moment of every day for five
years.”194 Further, unlike the information in earlier third-party precedent,
CSLI information had a particularly intimate relationship with the phone
user because a cell phone has become “almost a ‘feature of human
anatomy’” that can reveal visits to “doctor’s offices, political headquarters,
and other potentially revealing locales.”195 Finally, the capabilities of CSLI
represented a “seismic shift” in technology from Miller and Smith because

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2219.
Id.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2218.
Id.
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the “exhaustive chronicle of location information” can be “casually
collected” with a “click of a button.”196
DNA, in 1) the nature of the information it contains, 2) the
relationship of that information with the individuals claiming Fourth
Amendment protection and 3) the capability of the technology exploiting it,
shares similarities with the CSLI in Carpenter. Analysis of these three
factors indicates that the Court would refuse to extend its third-party
doctrine to warrantless government collection of DNA information from
genealogical sites. Trouble starts for officials using genetic genealogy with
the first factor regarding the “nature” of the information collected. It is hard
to overstate the intimacy of DNA information, housed in the “nucleus of all
human cells,” which offers a blueprint to the entire body.197 DNA provides
a “treasure trove” of private data, including details on “family, lineage and
ethnicity” and even a window into potential disease.198 The very sensitivity
of DNA information forces commercial sites such as 23andMe to “work
very hard to protect their customers’ privacy.”199 While Carpenter’s CSLI
could reveal a visit to the doctor’s office, DNA could expose the
underlying health issue itself.200
Carpenter’s focus on the relationship of information to the individual
also favors Fourth Amendment protection of genealogical information. If a
cellphone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy,’” DNA is quite literally
a feature of human anatomy.201 DNA is “deeply revealing” precisely
because it intimately maps a person’s behavior and, in part, fate.202 Without
discounting the importance of environment, DNA has been linked to such
deeply sensitive personal traits as promiscuity, learning ability, and violent
criminality.203 The information on genealogy sites would therefore

196. Id. at 2219.
197. King, 569 U.S. at 442.
198. Jouvenal et al., supra note 62.
199. Shapiro, supra note 64.
200. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2223.
203. Susan Donaldson James, Thrill-Seeking Gene Can Lead to More Sex Partners,
ABC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/scientists-discover-gene-resp
onsible-cheating-promiscuous-sex-habits/story?id=12322891 (“[A]bout half of all people
have a gene that makes them more vulnerable to promiscuity and cheating.”). Julia Rosen,
About Half of Kids’ Learning Ability Is in Their DNA, Study Says, L.A. TIMES (July 11,
2014), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-math-reading-genes-201407
11-stor y.html (“[A]pproximately half of False children’s math and reading ability stemmed
from their genetic makeup.”). Melissa Hogenboom, Two Genes Linked with Violent Crime,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-enviro nment-29760212
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represent a “world of difference” from Miller and Smith, thus
distinguishing this precedent into insignificance.204
Finally, Carpenter’s discussion regarding the capabilities of the
government technology being used militates against allowing visits to
genealogical sites without a warrant. Carpenter forbade warrantless use of
cell phone data because of the “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”
of CSLI technology.205 The daunting scope of CSLI searches was
presumably due to its ability to penetrate fully into the many aspects of its
target’s lives by learning a person’s every location in collecting no less
than 101 data points a day.206 In comparison, the DNA making up
genealogical information penetrates at a deeper level, revealing such
secrets as susceptibility to certain diseases, such as breast cancer,
Huntington’s disease, and cystic fibrosis.207 Moreover, DNA can reveal a
person’s potential longevity, risk of obesity, his or her body clock (whether
an early riser or a night owl), and possession of “sensation-seeking and
impulsive tendencies.”208 Therefore, the Court that was offended by the
prospect of the government tracking individuals by every nearby cell site
would likely be appalled by official intrusion into DNA.
Further, Carpenter worried about the “inescapable and automatic
nature” of CSLI collection.209 Anyone who uses a smartphone—a
technology so necessary today that people “compulsively carry cellphones
with them all the time”—is exposed to information collection even when
the phone is not in use.210 DNA housed on genealogy sites shares the
involuntary character of CSLI exposure. No one could stop a government
official from looking at the DNA one shares with a relative. Once an
individual uploads his or her DNA, any distant cousin or granddaughter
sharing this DNA is helpless to opt out. More fundamentally, one does not
choose his or her DNA at birth and, so far, has no ability to change it

(“A genetic analysis of almost 900 offenders in Finland has revealed two genes associated
with violent crime.”).
204. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
205. Id. at 2223.
206. Id. at 2212.
207. James Randerson, What DNA Can Tell Us: Genes Alone Cannot Account for What
a Person Is, But Even the Slightest Distinguishing Traits Between People Can be Attributed
to Individual Genes, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/
science/2008/apr/27/genetics.cancer.
208. Id.
209. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
210. Id. at 2218.
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thereafter. The DNA, automatically self-replicating in each cell, generates
by a process beyond human will.
Carpenter also feared the time-machine character of CSLI technology,
noting that a search of cell site data enabled officials to “travel back in time
to retrace a person’s whereabouts.211 To perform such tracking, police
“need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular
individual, or when.”212 When it comes to investigating the intricate details
of a person’s past, DNA is even more Orwellian than CSLI. While CSLI
can allow the government to review “five years,” genealogical genetics
enables officialdom to explore untold generations.213
In the past, the Court has recognized the potential for “highly
sophisticated” technology to corrode privacy.214 Indeed, the Court has
explicitly noted, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology.”215 Carpenter’s concerns, therefore, are not
unjustified. If the Court found CSLI collection to be “qualitatively
different” from earlier cases allowing government access to shared
information, the prospect of official use of the even more intrusive
technology—genetic genealogy—will likely raise the Court’s ire.216 When
confronted with government exploitation of genealogy sites, therefore, the
Court will probably follow Carpenter in ensuring that the “‘progress of
science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”217

The Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Consent Precedent Will
Likely Not Support Government Exploration of Genealogical
Sites for Genetic Information
When a person uploads his or her DNA information to a genealogy
site, this individual is giving consent for others to access this information.

211. Id. at 2210.
212. Id. at 2218.
213. Id.; Jouvenal, supra note 2. Further, certain language in Carpenter indicated that
the Court might find the very purpose for which the government visited a genealogical site
to be concerning. In downplaying the intrusiveness of Smith’s pen registers, Carpenter
noted that such “telephone call logs reveal little in the way of ‘identifying information.’” Id.
at 19. The entire purpose of examining genealogical data in the Golden State Killer case was
to identify the Golden State Killer suspect—to name an individual as perpetrator.
214. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
215. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
216. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
217. Id. at 2223.
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Since the genetic information the person is providing is partly shared by
others, the upload could be seen as an example of third-party consent,
where one person gives permission to intrude on an area or thing
commonly possessed with another. The Court explored the Fourth
Amendment implications of third-party consent in United States v.
Matlock.218 In Matlock, police officers arrested William Matlock for
robbery in the front yard of his residence.219 After placing Matlock in a
squad car,220 the officers went to the house and met Mrs. Gayle Graff,
“who was dressed in a robe and was holding her son in her arms.”221 Mrs.
Graff permitted police to search for money and a gun in the bedroom of a
home that she jointly occupied with Matlock.222 As a result of the
consensual search of the bedroom, officers found $4,995.00 in cash inside
a diaper bag.223
Since Matlock himself did not consent to the search, the issue before
the Court was “whether Mrs. Graff’s relationship to the east bedroom was
sufficient to make her consent to the search valid against . . . Matlock.”224
The Court ruled, “the consent of one who possesses common authority
over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting
person with whom that authority is shared.”225 A person’s “common
authority” to give consent is not based on “mere property interest.”226 This
power instead rests “on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes.”227 The sharing of access
or control makes it “reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants
has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.”228 In sharing a place with another person, one
automatically assumes that other person might expose that “common area”

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171, n. 7.
Id.
Id.
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to others, even the police. Thus, Matlock, in sharing a bedroom with Mrs.
Graff, took the risk that she might allow officers to enter and search it.229
Matlock, tucked away in a patrol car before police approached his
home, never had the opportunity to object to a search of his bedroom.230
Scott Randolph, in Georgia v. Randolph, was under no similar restraint.231
In Randolph, Scott Randolph was present and arguing with his estranged
wife, Janet Randolph, when she “readily gave” consent to search for
Scott’s “items of drug evidence” in their house.232 Relying on Janet’s
consent, the officer recovered cocaine from the Randolph’s bedroom.233
The issue presented to the Court was whether a search based on third party
consent is lawful “with the permission of one occupant when the other,
who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and
expressly refuses to consent.”234 Randolph held, “a physically present cooccupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless
search unreasonable and invalid as to him.”235
Randolph based its ruling on “widely shared social expectations.”236
Society’s understanding about who possesses the authority to consent to a
particular search, while influenced by property law, is “not controlled by its
rules.”237 Instead, social expectations about consent are “a function of
commonly held understandings about the authority that co-inhabitants may
exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.”238 Randolph elucidated
its “commonly held understanding” concept through a series of examples.
The Court first presented the societal expectations of Matlock:
When someone comes to the door of a domestic dwelling
with a baby at her hip, as Mrs. Graff did, she shows that she
belongs there, and that fact standing alone is enough to tell a law
enforcement officer or any other visitor that if she occupies the
place along with others, she probably lives there subject to the
assumption tenants usually make about their common authority
229. Id. at 175–76.
230. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
231. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
232. Id. at 107.
233. Specifically, the officer found “a section of a drinking straw with a powdery
residue he suspected was cocaine.” Id.
234. Id. at 106.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 111.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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when they share quarters. They understand that any one of them
may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious
to one may nevertheless be admitted in his absence by another.239
Matlock, in choosing to live in such an arrangement, assumed a risk
that his cohabitant would invite others inside the home in his absence, an
arrangement so typical that officers rightly could rely upon it without
making inquiries into the possibility of some “eccentric scheme” to the
contrary.240 In contrast, Randolph noted that “no common authority could
sensibly be suspected” for a landlord offering admission into an apartment
without first seeking permission from the tenant or a hotel manager
allowing entry into a room without asking for approval from the current
hotel guest.241 Moreover, an eight-year-old child, who could invite a
“pollster or salesman” across the threshold of a home, could not allow
rummaging “through his parents’ bedroom.”242 Finally, a homeowner’s
authority to admit someone “over the objection of” his or her houseguest
was limited because of the “customary expectation of courtesy or
deference” shown a houseguest.243 Randolph concluded, “there is no
common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority
to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color
of the curtains or invitations to outsiders.”244
The Court again considered a “disputed invitation”245 in Fernandez v.
California, a case in which Fernandez objected to an officer’s entry by
announcing, “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my
rights.”246 Having probable cause that Fernandez had assaulted his
domestic partner, police arrested him and took him to the station.247 An
officer then returned to Fernandez’s residence, successfully gaining
permission to search from his domestic partner, Rojas.248 The resulting
search recovered evidence linking Fernandez to a robbery.249 While noting
239. Id.
240. Id. at 111–12.
241. Id. at 112 (further explaining that “a hotel guest customarily has no reason to
expect the manager to allow anyone but his own employees into his room”).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 113.
244. Id. at 114.
245. Id.
246. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303-304 (2014).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1131.
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that a caller would have “no confidence” in one occupant’s invitation if a
co-occupant was present and objecting, Fernandez believed that the
calculus “would be quite different” if “the objecting tenant was not
standing at the door.”250 With the objecting occupant absent, “the friend or
visitor is much more likely to accept the invitation to enter.”251 Fernandez
thus adhered to the social norms analysis developed in Randolph.
If the Court applied only Matlock’s “assumption of risk” test, it would
provide inadequate answers for those whose relatives have uploaded DNA
onto genealogical websites.252 When a person shares his or her genetic
information with an open source site, such as GEDmatch, this individual
makes a privacy decision for his or her whole family.253 The GEDmatch
user forfeits “the genetic privacy of an entire family for generations,”254
destroying the privacy both of relatives unknown and unborn. Matlock’s
reliance on “mutual use” would fail family members because even though
two distant relatives may both possess certain segments of information in
their chromosomes, such “mutual use” would fail to establish the “common
authority” envisioned by the Court.255 Rather than making a conscious
choice to share a particular piece of property, relatives having the same
portion of DNA instead share information—without any volitional
decision. Also, unlike Matlock’s shared bedroom, mutual use does not
provide “joint control,” as each relative “uses” his or her genome
separately and automatically, through biological processes, without input
from any other family member.256 This lack of interaction among mutual
users denies any opportunity to negotiate the terms of privacy. Since the
transmission of DNA by birth is a wholly programmed process, common
possessors of DNA could not be said to have “assumed the risk” that, in the
involuntary “act” of sharing genes with family, any particular member has

250. Id. at 1135.
251. Id.
252. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n. 7.
253. New York University Law Professor Erin Murphy explained, “If I’m making a
decision that affects my brother, my sister, my father, my children, essentially everybody
I’m related to, I think that’s really different.” Megan Jula, The Breakthrough DNA
Technique that Led Cops to the Golden State Killer Suspect Is Exciting—and Terrifying,
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/04/thebreakthrough-dna-technique-that-led-cops-to-the-golden-state-killer-suspect-is-exciting-an
d-terrifying/.
254. Id.
255. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
256. Id. at 171, n. 7.
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consciously chosen to allow another to expose shared information.257 Since
Matlock’s underlying assumptions do not apply in the genetic genealogy
context, its reasoning lacks convincing force, and therefore the case offers
little guidance to the Court regarding government visits to genealogical
sites.
In the face of Matlock’s inadequacy in assessing genetic genealogy,
the Court could turn to Randolph and Fernandez. However, as currently
applied, Randolph’s and Fernandez’s objecting occupant would not clarify
genealogical privacy issues. Considering “widely shared social
expectations,” Randolph bridled at the thought of overriding a physically
present co-occupant’s refusal to allow entry.258 In contrast, Fernandez
considered the situation “quite different” when an objecting tenant failed to
be “standing at the door.”259 Since each of us has an untold number of
relatives who could access genealogical sites at any time and any place on
the globe, we cannot be ever-present at each computer a relative is using to
access the Internet. All of us would inevitably be an absent occupant in
most places and at most times. Under Fernandez, our absence at each
genealogical site “door” upon which the government knocked when
exploring DNA would deny us a right to privacy. Given the lack of an
actual objection, the Court would simply return to the absent—and silent—
cohabitant originally considered in Matlock.
To adequately address third party consent in the genetic genealogy
context, the Court would need to refine Randolph’s “widely shared social
expectations” test for Matlock’s absent and un-objecting mutual user
context.260 While Randolph did apply its societal expectations test to
Matlock’s facts, it concluded that an occupant could admit an “obnoxious”
visitor in the cohabitant’s absence.261 Given the inability of an individual to
be at every door the government might open by visiting a genealogy site,
Randolph’s willingness to admit every obnoxious visitor might be strained
to the breaking point.
A flat rejection of Randolph’s conclusion, however, would not alone
identify the “widely shared social expectations” about genealogy sites.262
There is a difficulty in analyzing social expectations in this context, due to
the recent advent of genealogy sites. GEDmatch began operations as late as

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106, 111.
Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 303.
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.
Id.
Id.
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2010.263 Such newness has not allowed for a full societal consensus to
emerge. In contrast, the rights of the homeowner have been understood
with relative certainty since 1603, when articulated in Semayne’s Case.264
Further, a “consensus” has not even been formed in individual minds, if
one considers the inconsistent behavior of persons using the Internet. Often
people will blithely give up privacy by clicking “agree” to myriad privacy
policies they have chosen not to read. When privacy invasions make the
news, however, these same persons can be brought up short by the
intrusiveness of an incursion. Peter Neufeld of The Innocence Project has
noted, “There is a whole generation that says, ‘I don’t really care about
privacy,” until “there is a Cambridge Analytica.”265 Neufeld continued,
“No one has thought about what are the possible consequences.”266 This
same dynamic could play out with genealogy sites. Focused on the
immediate goal of tracking down a lost relative, persons might not see the
long view which, had they pondered it, could appall them.
If, with the passage of time, persons did pause to consider the privacy
concerns of genetic genealogy, most would likely not expect that their
relatives, however distant or unknown, could permit entry into something
as “deeply revealing” as DNA.267 It is one thing to enable another person to
allow exploration of the privacy of a shared home. It is quite another to
permit investigation into the privacy of shared genes. Although the issue
has not had time to fully cohere, “widely shared social expectations” will
likely forbid one person giving the government permission to use shared
DNA against a relative.

263. Cyrus Farivar, GEDmatch, a Tiny DNA Analysis Firm, Was Key for Golden State
Killer Case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/
04/gedmatch-a-tiny-dna-analysis-firm-was-key-for-golden-state-killer-case/ (“In fact, when
it first began in 2010, GEDmatch did not even require a login.”).
264. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
265. Kolata, supra note 66; see generally Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.
html. (“Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm hired by President Trump’s 2016 election
campaign, gained access to private information on more than 50 million Facebook users.
The firm offered tools that could identify the personalities of American voters and influence
their behavior.”)
266. Kolata, supra note 66.
267. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
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If the Court Characterizes Law Enforcement’s Use of
Genealogical Sites as a Government Search that Occurred
after a Private Intrusion, the Lawfulness of the Official Search
Will Be Assessed in Reference to the Scope of the Earlier
Private Search
Suppose your neighbor, hoping to borrow a cup of sugar, enters the
cupboard of your unlocked home without permission while you are away.
Suppose further that your neighbor, looking in your bag of sugar, finds
powder cocaine, of which he promptly tells the police. Nothing stops law
enforcement from taking and using that knowledge about the cocaine’s
existence. Once a secret is out in the open, it can no longer be a secret; any
privacy interest in that bit of information is dead.
Therefore, the Court has determined that an invasion of privacy by an
individual citizen can have Fourth Amendment consequences on a later
government search. In Walter v. United States, packages containing 871
boxes of sexually explicit 8-millimeter films were delivered to the wrong
address, the hosiery company, L’Eggs Products, Inc.268 When employees at
the company opened the packages, they found on the boxes within
“suggestive drawings” and “explicit descriptions of the contents.”269 They
alerted the FBI to their find, causing agents to pick up the films and view
them with a projector.270 As a result, the federal government charged the
defendant with interstate transportation of obscene films.271 The Walter
Court thus confronted the issue of “whether the Fourth Amendment
required the agents to obtain a warrant before they screened the films.”272
In considering the case, Walter noted that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred when the L’Eggs employees themselves opened the
packages because “a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private
party does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”273 Further, the “private
wrongdoing” did not “deprive the government of the right to use evidence

268. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980); see also United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (“While there was no single opinion of the Court [in
Walter], a majority did agree on the appropriate analysis of a governmental search which
follows on the heels of a private one.”).
269. Id. at 651–52.
270. Id. at 652.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 651.
273. Id. at 656.
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that it ha(d) acquired lawfully.”274 Walter measured the reasonableness of
the government intrusion by reference to the earlier private invasion, noting
that nothing was wrongful about the government’s examination of the
packages’ contents “to the extent that they had already been examined by
third parties.”275 Noting the evils of the “indiscriminate searches”
performed under general warrants, Walter declared that any authorized
search was “limited by the particular terms of its authorization.”276 In like
manner, a private party’s “invasion of another person’s privacy” limited a
later official search.277 While the government could reexamine the
materials previously viewed by private persons, it could not “exceed the
scope” of the prior private search without independent justification.278
Essentially, “the legality of the governmental search” had to be “tested by
the scope of the antecedent private search.”279
In Walter, the private search was limited, involving only the opening
of the package to reveal the explicit drawings and pictures on the boxes
inside, while the FBI’s intrusion was more invasive, including the watching
of the actual films.280 Therefore, the earlier private search only frustrated
the defendant’s reasonable privacy expectations “in part;” it “did not
simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all
Fourth Amendment protection.”281 Ultimately, Walter ruled that since “the
additional search conducted by the FBI—the screening of the films—was
not supported by any justification,” it violated the Fourth Amendment.282
Package problems were the focus of the Court’s next private party
search case, United States. v. Jacobsen.283 In Jacobsen, Federal Express
employees, pursuant to company policy regarding insurance claims,
examined “an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper” that was
“torn by a forklift.”284 Inside the box, employees found a 10-inch long
duct-tape tube, which they opened, finding plastic bags of white powder.285

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 116 (1984).
Walter, 447 U.S. at 651–52.
Id. at 659.
Id.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
Id. at 111.
Id.
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Replacing the bags in the tube and the tube into the box, the employees
then alerted the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).286 Upon arrival
the DEA agent:
saw that one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed
the four plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He
then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of
the white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the
spot identified the substance as cocaine.287
The Court in Jacobsen adopted the reasoning it applied in Walter.
Jacobsen, noting that Federal Express employees cut the tube and exposed
the white powder, declared, “Whether those invasions were accidental or
deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character.”288 The
DEA’s “additional invasions” had to be “tested by the degree to which they
exceeded the scope of the private search.”289 If the DEA did not move
beyond the private invasion, then there was no Fourth Amendment
violation.290 Since the defendant could not complain about a frustration of
privacy expectations by a private party, the government was welcome to
use the “now-nonprivate information.”291 If instead the DEA intruded
beyond Federal Express’s initial invasion, then the Fourth Amendment was
triggered “with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already
been frustrated.”292
Jacobsen then specified two distinct intrusions the DEA committed:
1) the DEA agents “removed the tube from the box, the plastic bags from
the tube and a trace of powder from the innermost bag,” and 2) they “made
a chemical test of the powder.”293 The DEA’s first intrusion involving
opening the package and picking up the tube gave the government no
information it had not learned from the Federal Express employees.294 The

286. Id.
287. Id. at 111–12.
288. Id. at 115.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 117.
291. Id.
292. Id. Jacobsen noted, “In such a case the authorities have not relied on what is in
effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment if they
act without a warrant.” Id. at 117–18.
293. Id. at 118.
294. Id. at 118–119.
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defendants “could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package,
since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had
just examined the package and had, of their own accord, invited the federal
agent to their offices for the express purpose of viewing its contents.”295
Likewise, the DEA’s removal of the bags from the tube and visually
inspecting them “enabled the agent to learn nothing that had not previously
been learned during the private search.”296
The Court also analyzed the DEA’s second intrusion “occasioned by
the field test, which had not been conducted by the Federal Express agents
and therefore exceeded the scope of the private search.”297 Since a Fourth
Amendment search required government intrusion on a privacy expectation
that was “reasonable”—or “legitimate”—Jacobsen viewed the field test
intrusion through the prism of what interests could be considered
“legitimate.”298 Society need not recognize as “legitimate” information
regarding “wrongful” behavior, such as burglar’s presence in an empty
cabin.299 The DEA’s “chemical test,” which merely disclosed the existence
of cocaine—a substance illegal to possess—did not implicate “any
legitimate interest in privacy.”300
Thus, Walter and Jacobsen’s key point was that the amount of Fourth
Amendment protection from a government intrusion depended on the scope
of any earlier private invasion. Walter only found fault when the FBI went
beyond the prior private search—opening the package and viewing the
explicit drawings and pictures on the boxes within them—by actually
watching the films.301 In short, the test was framed by the extent of the “the
antecedent private search.”302 This analysis could open a path to admission
for evidence from genetic genealogical sites. When a person, on his or her
own initiative, provides a saliva sample to a commercial site, such as
23andMe, and then uploads the results to an open genealogical site, such as
GEDmatch, the individual is essentially exposing the portions of his or her
DNA shared with relatives. Much as Walter’s L’Eggs employees opened
the package or Jacobsen’s Federal Express employees cut the tube, the
individual family member uploading his genetic information tears open

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 119.
Id. at 119–120.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Walter, 447 U.S. at 651–52, 658.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116.
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segments of the DNA of all of his or her relatives to public view. When
investigators later obtain this genetic information from GEDmatch, this
initial collection itself goes no further than the original “antecedent private
search.”303
The only question remaining is whether government use of the DNA
information in forming family trees and in comparing genes with crime
scene samples amounts to a further official intrusion akin to the FBI
watching the film from the opened box in Walter.304 The investigation
techniques used to locate the Golden State Killer suspect after visiting
GEDmatch do not seem likely to be considered further intrusions on par
with viewing the film in Walter. Hole’s subsequent investigation in pursuit
of DeAngelo involved only old-fashioned gumshoe detective work into
public information. Reviews of census records, gravesite locators, and old
newspaper obituaries involve only the examination of information
available to anyone wishing to view it.305 The “antecedent private search”
precedent could thus provide law enforcement with a door through which it
might get genetic genealogy evidence admitted despite the lack of a
warrant.
Any person challenging evidence from a relative that the government
has obtained from a genealogical site will have to establish “standing,” or
the personal right to challenge the particular Fourth Amendment violation.
Suppose the government acknowledged that its search for the Golden
State Killer suspect’s distant relative on a genealogical site violated the
Fourth Amendment. Would such concession help the suspect exclude the
results of this genealogical search from court? It could be argued that the
person who could claim invasion of privacy from the genealogical visit is
not the suspect but the relative who’s DNA was the subject of state
scrutiny. Any link to the suspect came only from DNA the suspect left—or
essentially abandoned—at the crime scene as semen, blood, or other
biological material. As previously noted, the later tracing from a distant
relative’s common ancestor—the great, great, great, grandparent—
involved306 traditional types of investigation, such as looking at gravesites

303. Id.
304. The DEA’s field test of the powder in Jacobsen, unlike the FBI search in Walter,
was found to not implicate a “legitimate” expectation of privacy. Id. at 123.
305. Jouvenal, TO FIND ALLEGED GOLDEN STATE KILLER, supra note 2, at 2. Officials
also examined “police and commercial databases.” Id. While law enforcement’s reference to
its own databases should not trigger a Fourth Amendment issue, the privacy concerns
surrounding use of “commercial” databases would depend on the specifics involved
in each particular visit. Id.
306. Winton, supra note 60.
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and checking newspapers and census records,307 which would raise no
Fourth Amendment red flags. This issue, commonly referred to as
“standing,”308 involves the question of who precisely has the right to
contest a particular Fourth Amendment violation.309
One of the most significant cases on the issue of “standing,” or the
right to contest a Fourth Amendment search, is Rakas v. Illinois, a case
which altered even the language employed in this area of the law.310 In
Rakas, officers, suspecting a stopped car of being involved in a robbery,
ordered its occupants out of the vehicle.311 When Rakas and two others
then exited the vehicle, the officers searched the car, discovering “a box of

rifle shells in the glove compartment, which had been locked, and a
sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat.”312 Rakas moved to
suppress these items as recovered during an unlawful search.313 The trial
court ruled Rakas lacked standing to contest the search because he, being
merely a passenger, did not own the car and further did not claim
ownership of the gun or shells.314
Rakas described the “concept of standing” as focusing on “whether
the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search as a basis for
suppressing evidence was himself the ‘victim’ of the search or seizure.”315
“Standing” involved two questions: “first, whether the proponent of a
particular legal right has alleged “injury in fact,” and, second, whether the
proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing
his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties.”316 Rakas, however, was
less than pleased with the “‘standing’ terminology”317 because such
language caused the issue to be falsely seen as “theoretically distinct from
the merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.”318 The Court
concluded that the “definition” of Fourth Amendment rights was “more
307. Jouvenal, supra note 2, at 2.
308. The Court, in Byrd v. United States, commented, “It is worth noting that most
courts analyzing the question presented in this case . . . have described it as one of Fourth
Amendment ‘standing.’” 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018).
309. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 130.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 130.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 132.
316. Id. at 139.
317. Id. at 133.
318. Id.
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properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law
than within that of standing.”319
Rakas deemed Fourth Amendment rights as “personal rights” that
could “not be vicariously asserted.”320 The Court ruled, “A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or
property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.321
Only those “whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated” could
seek exclusion of the evidence obtained from that violation.322 Rakas
contested the search of the glove compartment and the space under the
car’s seat, yet he did not claim that he had “any legitimate expectation of
privacy” in these areas.323 Lacking a reasonable privacy expectation, Rakas
necessarily lacked a Fourth Amendment right in the car, and therefore
could not contest the police illegality. In terms that Rakas would have
disapproved, he lacked “standing” to claim the officer’s search of the car
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
In the next case involving the right to contest a search of a vehicle,
Byrd v. United States, the Court had mellowed its stance on the
terminology of “standing” by noting, “The concept of standing in Fourth
Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a
person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place
searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search.”324 In Byrd,
Terrence Byrd and Latasha Reed drove in Byrd’s Honda to Budget car
rental in New Jersey. Reed then entered the agency and rented a car while
Byrd stayed outside in his Honda. After signing a rental contract that
explicitly provided, “PERMITTING AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER TO
OPERATE THE VEHICLE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RENTAL
AGREEMENT,” Reed handed the rental’s keys to Byrd, who drove off in
the rental car.325 Later, a Pennsylvania trooper stopped Byrd as he was
driving the rental car to Pittsburgh.326 The officer noticed when he
approached the car, Byrd was so nervous that he “was shaking and had a

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 150, n. 17.
Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1530.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
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hard time obtaining his driver’s license.”327 Another officer then arrived at
the scene.328 When the troopers learned Byrd was not listed as an
authorized driver on the rental agreement, they told him they could search
the car without consent. The resulting search of the car’s trunk revealed
“body armor and 49 bricks of heroin,” exposing Byrd to federal drug
charges.329
When presented with this case, the Byrd Court asked, “Does a driver
of a rental car have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car when he
or she is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement?”330
While noting that the legitimacy of privacy expectations “must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment,” Byrd identified two such
sources: 1) “concepts of real or personal property law,” and 2)
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”331 Relying
on the “general property-based concept,” the Court determined that Byrd
was the “sole occupant” of the car and therefore “could exclude others
from it.”332 Byrd declared, “one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls
property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by
virtue of [the] right to exclude.”333 Acknowledging that Byrd “violated the
rental agreement,” the Court dismissed this fact because, “As anyone who
has rented a car knows, car-rental agreements are filled with long lists of
restrictions.”334 “Few would contend,” urged the Court, that violating such
provisions as driving on an unpaved road or while holding a cellphone,
“has anything to do with a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
rental car.”335 Byrd therefore held, “the mere fact that a driver in lawful
possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement
will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.”336

327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1523.
330. Id. at 1527. Deciding whether Byrd had “his own Fourth Amendment rights
infringed by the search” meant determining whether he had a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the place searched. Id. at 1526.
331. Id. at 1527. The “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” will
not be explored in this Article in light of the previous discussions regarding privacy
expectations in supra Section B of Part IV and “widely shared social expectations” in supra
Section C of Part IV.
332. Id. at 1527, 1528.
333. Id. at 1528.
334. Id. at 1529.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1531.
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Byrd, in applying property law principles to determine whether a
person possessed the reasonable expectation of privacy to contest a search,
offered another test that could be used to consider the admissibility of
evidence obtained from genealogy sites. Through Byrd’s lens, asking
whether a person has standing to challenge a government visit of a family
member’s genealogy site amounts to inquiring whether that person has a
property right enabling him or her to exclude others from the site. The
design and operation of GEDmatch undermines any such ability to exclude.
In its “Terms of Service and Privacy Policy,” GEDmatch alerts potential
users, “GEDmatch exists to provide DNA and genealogy tools for
comparison and research purposes.”337 The comparison and research that
GEDmatch mentions are collaborative processes that can only work by
sharing information. The sites’ very existence, along with the million
uploads made on it, demonstrate the inability to exclude others.338
GEDmatch further notes, “DNA and Genealogical research, by its very
nature, requires the sharing of information. Because of that, users
participating in this Site agree that their information will be shared with
other users.”339 The site’s terms of service, in twice explicitly referencing
sharing, again show a lack of property interest by a relative in excluding
others. Finally, GEDmatch explains, “Raw DNA data uploaded to
GEDmatch.Com (‘Raw Data’) remains the property of the person who
uploaded it.”340 In this statement, the only property interest GEDmatch
acknowledges is that of the person uploading the DNA, not the relatives
who might contest the viewing of it. Under Byrd’s “general property-based
concept,” without a right to exclude, one has no property interest, without a
property interest, one has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and
without such a privacy expectation, one has no standing.341 Since a relative
cannot exclude others from GEDmatch’s site, his or her standing fails at
the outset.

337. GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, https://www.
gedmatch.c om/tos.htm (last modified May 20, 2018).
338. Jouvenal et al., supra note 62.
339. GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, https://www.
gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last modified May 20, 2018).
340. Id.
341. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1528.
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Conclusion
Facing the daunting realization that there are “200,000-plus cold cases
in the United States,” Kenneth Mains, “founder of the American
Investigative Society of Cold Cases,” has argued that any resource which
helps close such cases “needs to be utilized.”342 The National District
Attorneys Association’s Josh Marquis wondered, “Why in God’s name
would we come up with a reason that we are not able to use” these genetic
websites?343 While law enforcement is keenly aware of the potential
“investigative goldmine” of these databases, the persons who use them
“aren’t really thinking through the implications of creating this treasure
trove of data that can be mined.”344 University of Michigan law professor
Barbara McQuade has noted that for most people, DNA is so “very private,
very personal” that “even if you have given it up to one of these third-party
services, maybe there should be a higher level of security.”345 There thus
exists a gap between the perceptions of investigators zealously pursuing
criminals and laypersons who have not considered the full consequences of
this rapidly advancing technology. It is in this gap that Fourth Amendment
rights, not fully appreciated by those using genealogical websites, might
fall.
Further, full privacy protection from government use of genetic
genealogy might be beyond the volitional power of any one individual.
Those who, after educating themselves on every aspect of genealogical
privacy, choose to forgo uploading their own DNA, might still find their
genetic information probed by the government. “Even if we’ve never spit
into a test tube, some of our genetic information may be public—and
accessible to law enforcement.”346 There is no getting around the fact that
any person, upon submitting DNA information to a public genealogy site,
exposes the DNA of his or her relatives, even if “distant” or “far flung.”347
This breach occurs regardless of the consent or even the knowledge of
thousands.
If confronted with the Fourth Amendment issues of genetic
genealogy, the Court could address the concerns created by this new
technology in a variety of ways. The Court could turn to its earlier case

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Jouvenal et al., supra note 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gafni, supra note 57.
Id.
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involving DNA collection of arrestees entering custody, Maryland v. King.
Such an approach would bear so little fruit, due to the narrowness of King’s
ruling, that the Court would have to craft a new rule for the entirely
separate issue of government collection of DNA information on the
Internet.348 The Court could analyze genetic genealogy’s privacy issues by
considering Carpenter’s latest application of the third-party doctrine.349
The force of Carpenter’s reasoning would likely cause the Court to view
genetic genealogy as so sophisticated and the information it handled as so
sensitive that a government visit to a genealogy site would be deemed a
Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant.350 The Court could consider
a person’s uploading of DNA information as amounting to a grant of
consent to search the portions of his or her genome held in common with
relatives. Then, the third-party consent precedent’s “widely shared social
expectations” would likely reject government use of DNA information
without a warrant.351 Two other Fourth Amendment doctrines, Walter and
Jacobsen’s “antecedent private search” rule352 and Byrd’s “general
property-based concept” definition of standing, offer law enforcement with
potential avenues for admission of genetic genealogy evidence.353 Should
the Court deem a person’s upload of DNA information onto a genealogy
site to be a prior private search, then Walter and Jacobsen would permit the
government to explore this same genetic information—previously exposed
by a private person—without a warrant. Finally, following Byrd’s
reasoning, the government could avoid the exclusion of evidence obtained
in visiting a genealogy site even if the warrantless download of genetic
information was found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Since the family
member could not exclude others from visiting the genealogy site, he or
she could not establish a property interest sufficient to support standing to
challenge the search in the first place.354 The Court’s decision about the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of warrantless government collection of
genetic information from genealogy sites will thus turn on how it chooses
to frame the question triggered by this new technology. When it comes to
genetic genealogy, as with much else in the world of heredity, where you
end up all depends on where you start.

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

King, 569 U.S. at 449, 462.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
Id.
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116.
Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1528.
Id.
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